01The fictitious supplier and collusion
The fictitious supplier is the classic scheme: a buyer creates a supplier they control, issues orders, approves invoices and triggers payment to their own account. It thrives when one person can create a supplier, approve spend and initiate a transfer.
The guard is segregation of duties. Creating a supplier, approving a requisition and executing a payment must sit with three distinct roles. Software that enforces this makes the scheme impossible without active collusion between several people — and every action leaves a timestamped trail in the audit log.
02Collusive overbilling
Overbilling involves a real supplier who, in league with a buyer, invoices above the agreed price or the delivered volume, the difference split between them. It is harder to spot because the supplier exists and genuinely delivers.
Three-way matching is decisive here: the invoice is compared to the purchase order and the receipt. A price or quantity gap blocks payment and raises an exception only an authorized role can clear, with written justification. Tracking the exception rate per buyer surfaces the profiles that force overrides too often.
03Double payment and bank-detail hijack
Double payment often starts as an error that becomes opportunistic fraud: the same invoice is paid twice, once manually then in a run, and the overpayment is never reclaimed. A duplicate check on invoice number, supplier and amount, applied before disbursement, eliminates it.
Bank-detail hijack is rising sharply: a fraudster impersonates a supplier and asks to change the IBAN before a due date. The defense is both procedural and software-based: any IBAN change triggers dual-control validation and an alert, and the history of bank details stays auditable.
04What the statutory auditor wants to see
A statutory auditor does not judge your good faith, they test your controls. They want to see that segregation of duties is enforced by the system, that matching exceptions are justified, that supplier and IBAN changes are traced, and that the audit log is tamper-evident.
Procure-to-Pay software produces this evidence natively. Where an Excel folder rests on trust and memory, the system answers the auditor s question — who did what, when, on which document — in a few clicks. That is mission time saved and reassessment risk avoided.